Abstract. In 2012, Tseng and Tsai presented a novel revocable ID (identity)-based public key setting that provides an efficient revocation mechanism with a public channel to revoke misbehaving or compromised users from public key systems. Subsequently, based on Tseng and Tsai's revocable ID-based public key setting, Tsai et al. proposed a new revocable ID-based signature (RIBS) scheme in the standard model (without random oracles). However, their RIBS scheme possesses only existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message attacks. In the article, we propose the first strongly secure RIBS scheme without random oracles under the computational Diffie-Hellman and collision resistant assumptions. Comparisons with previously proposed schemes are made to demonstrate the advantages of our scheme in terms of revocable functionality and security property.
Introduction
Digital signature, one important cryptographic primitive, provides the integrity, authentication and non-repudiation of messages. In traditional public key systems, before verifying a signature, a user must obtain the corresponding authenticated public key (i.e. certificate) from public directories. In such a case, efficient public key management becomes an important issue. In 1984, to simplify public key management, Shamir [1] introduced the concept of identity (ID)-based cryptography (IBC), in which a user's public key is determined by his/her identity information such as social security number, e-mail address, telephone number, name, etc. Moreover, a trusted third party, called private key generator (PKG), is responsible to produce private keys which are distributed to users via secure channels. As opposed to traditional public key systems, IBC eliminates the requirement of certificates. Shamir's system was ingenious but not practical, however. In 2001, Boneh and Franklin [2] adopted Shamir's idea to propose a new ID-based public key system and the first practical ID-based encryption (IBE) based on modification of bilinear pairings defined on elliptic curves. Since then, a numerous primitives for IBC have been published such as ID-based authentication protocols [3] [4] [5] , ID-based key agreement protocols [6] [7] [8] , ID-based signature schemes [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] and ID-based encryption schemes [14] [15] [16] [17] . * 
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In 2002, according to Boneh and Franklin's IDbased public key setting [2] , Paterson [18] proposed an ID-based signature (IBS) scheme by making use of bilinear pairings. Later, Cha and Cheon [10] proposed a new IBS scheme that improved Paterson's scheme on both efficiency of computation and signature size while the security of their scheme was based on the gap Diffie-Hellman assumption. In 2009, Tseng et al. [19] and Shim [20] , independently, proposed efficient IBS schemes that are provably secure and support variant kinds of batch verifications. Both schemes significantly improve the verification performance for many cooperative and distributed applications. The four IBS schemes mentioned above have been shown to be secure in the random oracle model. However, when random oracles are instantiated with concrete hash functions, those IBS schemes could be insecure. In 2006, to overcome this problem, Paterson and Schuldt [9] proposed an IBS scheme without random oracles which is computationally efficient and has short signature size. In 2008, Narayan et al. [21] further improved Paterson and Schuldt's scheme by reducing the size of the public parameters.
All the IBS schemes mentioned above possess existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosenmessage attacks, but not strongly unforgeable. An IBS scheme is said to be strongly unforgeable if it is existentially unforgeable and an adversary who is given signatures of the IBS scheme on some message m is unable to generate a new signature on m. Strong unforgeability ensures that an adversary cannot generate a new signature for a previously signed message. Therefore, strongly unforgeable IBS schemes are important for constructing ID-based cryptographic schemes such as chosen-ciphertext secure ID-based cryptosystems and ID-based group signatures. In the past, several strongly unforgeable non-ID-based signature schemes [22] [23] [24] [25] without random oracles have been proposed. Furthermore, the work in [26] [27] [28] provided several transformation methods to construct strongly unforgeable IBS schemes out of strongly unforgeable non-ID-based signature schemes. Recently, without applying any transformation ways, Sato et al. [29] proposed a strongly unforgeable IBS scheme without random oracles based on Paterson and Schuldt's IBS scheme [9] . Their scheme offered better performance in terms of signature size and computation cost when compared with the schemes in [26] [27] [28] .
A public key system construction must provide a revocation mechanism to revoke misbehaving or compromised users from the system. In 2001, Boneh and Franklin [22] presented a revocation mechanism for ID-based public key systems, in which the PKG generates and sends new private keys for non-revoked users periodically. To do so, the PKG must establish a secure channel with each non-revoked user to transmit the new private key. The key update size is equal to the number of non-revoked users. Boldyreva et al. [30] applied a binary tree structure to construct a revocable ID-based encryption (RIBE) which reduces the key update size to the logarithm of the number of users. However, both revocation methods mentioned above need secure channels to transmit the users' new private keys periodically. This causes enormous computational load for both of encryption and decryption procedures.
In order to resolve the "secure channel" problem above, Tseng and Tsai [31] proposed a new RIBE scheme and offered a practical revocation mechanism with a "public channel". In their scheme, the PKG and nonrevoked users can significantly reduce computational burden due to the absence of encryption/decryption via secure channels. Subsequently, based on Tseng and Tsai's revocable ID-based public key setting, Sun et al. [32] proposed a revocable ID-based signature (RIBS) scheme in the random oracle model. Although the scheme [32] based on the random oracle model can offer better performance, the resulting scheme could be insecure when random oracles are instantiated with concrete hash functions [33, 34] . Furthermore, Tsai et al. [12] proposed the first RIBS scheme in the standard model (without random oracles). However, their RIBS scheme possesses only existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message attacks. In this article, we first present a new framework and security notions for strongly unforgeable RIBS schemes with revocation via public channels. We then propose the first strongly unforgeable RIBS scheme without random oracles. Under the computational Diffie-Hellman and collision resistant assumptions, we demonstrate that our RIBS scheme possesses strong unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message attacks. When compared with previously proposed IBS and RIBS schemes without random oracles, our scheme provides better performance in terms of computational cost and revocable functionality while possessing strong unforgeability.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Preliminaries are given in Section 2. In Section 3, we present the framework and security notions for strongly unforgeable RIBS schemes. Section 4 presents our concrete scheme. In Section 5, we analyze the security of our scheme. Comparisons are presented in Section 6. Conclusions are given in Section 7.
Preliminaries
In the section, we will briefly review some properties of bilinear pairings. We also introduce the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) and collision resistant (CRH) assumptions.
Bilinear pairings
Let G1 and G2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of large prime order p. Let g be a generator of G1. A mapping ê: G1G1  G2 is an admissible bilinear map if it satisfies the following properties:
ab , where a, b  Zp * .
2. Non-degeneracy: ê(g, g)  1. 3. Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute the value ê(g a , g b ).
Security assumptions
Two hard problems and their corresponding assumptions are presented here.
Definition 1 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem and Assumption). Let G1 be a cyclic multiplicative group of large prime order p with generator g. Given g a , g b  G1 with unknown a, b  Zp * , the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem in G1 is to compute g ab . We say that the (ε, t)-CDH assumption holds in the group G1 if no polynomial-time adversary A can solve the CDH problem in G1 with non-negligible probability ε within time t. Here, the successful probability (advantage) of the adversary A is presented as
where the probability is over the random choice consumed by the adversary A.
Definition 2. Collision-resistant hash (CRH) assumption. Let Hk:{0, 1} * {0, 1} n be a collisionresistant hash family of functions, where n is a fixed length and k is an index. We say that the (ε,t)-CRH assumption holds if no polynomial-time adversary A running in time at most t can break the collisionresistance of Hk with probability ε. Here, the successful probability (advantage) of the adversary A is presented as
The adversary A's advantage is defined as the probability that A wins the RID-SUF-ACMA game.
Remark 2.
An RIBS scheme is said to be strongly unforgeable if it is existentially unforgeable and an adversary who is given signatures of the RIBS scheme on some message m is unable to generate a new signature on m. Strong unforgeability ensures that an adversary cannot generate a new signature for a previously signed message.
Strongly unforgeable RIBS scheme
In this section, we present a concrete strongly unforgeable RIBS scheme without random oracles that consists of the following algorithms:
 Setup: Given a security parameter  and the total number z of all periods, the PKG chooses two cyclic groups G1 and G2 of sufficiently large prime order p >2 . Let g be a generator of G1 and ê: G1G1  G2 be an admissible bilinear map. The PKG sets the system secret key and the public parameters by performing the following tasks. and sends DID to the user via a secure channel.
 Time key update: Given a user's identity ID{0,1} * and a period t, the PKG computes a string vt = H2(ID, t) of length n. Let vtj denote the j-th bit of the string vt and let T ⊂ {1, 2,…, n} be the set of indices j such that vtj = 1 for j = 1, 2,…, n. Finally, the PKG chooses a random value rt  Zp * and computes the user's time update key TID,t = (T1, T2)
). The PKG sends TID,t to the user via a public channel. Upon receiving TID,t, the user combines it with his/her initial secret key DID = (D1, D2) to generate the signing key SID,t = (S1, S2, S3) =(D1T1, D2, T2) =(
).
 Signing: For a period t, given a non-revoked user's identity ID  {0, 1} * , a message M  {0, 1} * , the user first computes a string vm = H3(M) of length l. Let vmk denote the k-th bit of the string vm and let W ⊂ {1, 2,…, l} be the set of indices k such that vmk = 1 for k = 1, 2,…, l. Then the user chooses a random number rm  Zp * and computes and h= H4(M|| ). Finally, the user generates a signature on the message M as follows:
where (S1, S2, S3) is the signing key SID,t obtained above.
4 ) for an identity ID on a message M in a period t, a verifier computes h = H4(M|| 4 ) and validates the signature as follows:
The algorithm outputs "accept" if the checking equation above holds, and "reject" otherwise.
In the following, we show the correctness of the checking equation in the Verification algorithm as follows:
Security analysis
In this section, we give the security analysis of our RIBS scheme. In order to simplify the security analysis, we consider two types of adversaries, namely, outside adversary and inside adversary (or revoked user). We adopt a technique similar to that used in [12] to show that the proposed scheme possesses strong unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks for both types of adversaries under the CDH and CRH assumptions. Note that if the adversary is an outsider, it is allowed to issue all queries in the RID-SUF-ACMA game (mentioned in Section 3) except for the initial key extract query on the target identity ID * . If the adversary is an inside adversary, it is allowed to issue all queries in the RID-SUF-ACMA game except for the time key update query on (ID * , t * ). 
in which τ1 and τ2, respectively, denote the executing time of a multiplication in G1 and the executing time of an exponentiation in G1.
Proof. We assume that there exists an outside adversary A which succeeds in attacking the proposed RIBS scheme. We will construct an algorithm B to solve the CDH problem or violate CRH assumption. Assume that the algorithm B is given <G1, G2, ê, g, g where wk = 2 for 1 ≤ k ≤ l. Now, the challenger B has constructed a set of public parameters as 
Let vt = H2(ID, t)
which is a bit string of length n. Let T ⊂ {1, 2,…, n} be the set of indices j such that vtj = 1, where vtj denotes the j-th bit of the string vt, for j = 1, 2,…, n. Define the function E by
Let vm = H3(M)
which is a bit string of length l. Let W ⊂ {1, 2,…, l} be the set of indices k such that vmk = 1, where vmk denotes the k-th bit of the string vm, for k = 1, 2,…, l. Define the functions K and L by
Finally, for the cumbersome notations defined above, we conclude with three relations which will be referred to frequently in the sequel, namely, 
Now, we are convinced that DID = (D1, D2) is a valid initial secret key by 
This resolves the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem. 
Proof. We assume that there exists an inside adversary A which succeeds in attacking the proposed RIBS scheme. We will construct an algorithm B to solve the CDH problem or violate CRH assumption. Assume that the algorithm B is given <G1, G2, ê, g, g a , g b > as an instance of the CDH problem, where a and b are unknown to B. To compute g ab , the algorithm B must simulate a challenger for A in the RID-SUF-ACMA game as follows. Before performing Queries and Forgery between A and B, we define three sets U, T and W, and five functions E, F, J, K and L. Here, we consider two cases. to violate the CRH assumption. The executing time is
where τ1 and τ2 denote the executing time of a multiplication in G1 and an exponentiation in G1, respectively. □
Comparisons
For convenience, the following notations are used to analyze the performance.
 TGe: The time of executing a bilinear pairing operation in G2.
 Texp: The time of executing an exponentiation operation in G1.
 ||: The bit length of a message .
Note that in a multiplicative cyclic group, TGe and Texp are more time-consuming than the multiplication operation. Here, we compare with previously proposed schemes without random oracles to demonstrate the advantages of our RIBS scheme. Table 1 lists the comparisons among the schemes of Paterson and Schuldt [9] , Sato et al. [29] , Tsai et al. [12] and ours in terms of computational cost, signature size, revocable functionality and security property. For the computation cost in the signing phase, our scheme requires 5Texp to sign a message, which increases a little the computing cost in comparison to the other schemes. Nevertheless, our scheme has better performance than Sato et al.'s scheme in terms of the verification phase and signature size. On the other hand, we emphasize that our scheme possesses strong unforgeability, while Tsai et al.'s scheme offers only existential unforgeability. Note that strongly unforgeable signature schemes are important for constructing cryptographic schemes such as chosen-ciphertext secure cryptosystems and group signatures.
In the following, we show that Tsai et al.'s RIBS scheme [12] is not strongly secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks. Assume that an adversary RIBS scheme [12] violates the property of strong unforgeability in Definition 4 and Remark 2. Indeed, Paterson and Schuldt's scheme and Sato et al.'s scheme may be equipped with the revocation mechanism presented by Boneh and Franklin [2] . In this case, the revocation mechanism would require a secure channel to transmit the users' new private keys periodically which causes enormous computation workload for the PKG and (non-revoked) users when encrypting and decrypting private keys. Based on Tseng and Tsai's revocable ID-based public key setting, both RIBS schemes of Tsai et al. and ours adopt the revocation mechanism with a public channel, so that the computational burden can be significantly reduced due to the absence of encryption/decryption via secure channels.
Conclusions
In this article, an efficient strongly unforgeable RIBS scheme without random oracles was proposed. Comparisons with previously proposed schemes were made to demonstrate the advantages of our scheme in terms of revocable functionality and security property. In the standard model (without random oracles), we proved that our scheme possesses strong unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks under the CDH and CRH assumptions. Indeed, Tseng and Tsai's Strong Unforgeability revocable ID-based public key setting provides an efficient revocation mechanism with a public channel. Our strongly secure RIBS scheme is one of primitives for their revocable ID-based public key system and provides a fundamental to construct revocable IDbased cryptographic schemes such as chosenciphertext secure revocable ID-based cryptosystems and revocable ID-based group signatures.
